Abstract This chapter provides an analysis specific for Europe of the risk of plant pathogens being used as anti-crop bioweapons, taking into account both the biological and human dimensions of the threat. An historical review of anti-crop bioweapons lays down the starting point of the characterization and contextualizes the threat in Europe. Four types of threat are developed and provide a structure for the analysis: (1) from military state programs to allegations of attacks; (2) from 'rogue state' hidden programs to claimed terror attacks; (3) biocrime, sabotage, private allegations and conspiracy theories on social media; (4) from the overzealous application of phytosanitary measures to the deliberate introduction of a regulated pest to justify trade protectionism. A database consisting of 21 important target crops and of 63 potentially dangerous pests (selected from a list of 570 pests) are combined with the development and categorization of 'scenarios'. This is proposed as a starting point of a prospective approach to quantify the risk of agroterrorism in Europe. Four challenges ('Convergence Tactics', 'Constraints', 'Climate', and 'Conspiracy') are suggested to be the most important determinants of the forthcoming evolution of the threat. The prospect for Europe to successfully confront the increasing risk and challenges for the next decade is discussed.
Introduction and General Concerns
The globalization of markets and social links poses new challenges for plant health, food safety and security. 'Crop biosecurity', defined by Brasier (2008) as "protecting a state from invasive plant pathogens", is usually ensured by plant health policies and regulatory measures imposed by the state, often by the national government. Maintaining biosecurity has become a subject of widespread concern, heightened by the recent focus on failures in biosecurity, such as disease emergence and pest introductions (Anderson et al. 2004 ) and by the world-wide increasing scrutiny of pest risk analysis (PRA) as the basis for commodity trade regulation (Schrader and Unger 2003) . Europe has been concerned about biosecurity for some time, due to the specificities of its agriculture and its dominant commercial position in the international markets.
Several plant pests are perceived as serious threats to agricultural biosecurity and to agricultural industries and forestry in both developing and industrialized countries. The recent decades of booming trade in commodities and horticultural plants led to many new pest introductions (Waage and Mumford 2008; Sache et al. 2011) . Some plant pests threaten natural ecosystems as well as managed ones. One of these introductions was, for example, the fungus Phytophthora ramorum, which threatens indigenous forest trees in the United Kingdom (Brasier et al. 2004) . Another was the pine wood nematode Bursaphelenchus xylophilus, which currently is regarded as a major threat to French forests following its establishment in Portugal in 1999 (Mota et al. 1999) . Another recent example of disease emergence is the bacteria Xylella fastidiosa, which was first recorded in Puglia (Italy) in 2013, where it causes serious damage to olive trees, and in Corsica (France) in 2015, where it affects the ornamental hosts Polygala myrtifolia.
The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) promotes global harmonization of phytosanitary measures that are imposed by the different national plant protection organizations to prevent accidental introductions of exotic pests through trade imports. Regional plant protection organizations, such as the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation (EPPO), improve the harmonization of plant health protocols on a regional level. Today in the European Union (EU) approximately 300 pests have been identified as quarantine pests, largely on the basis of EPPO's recommendations. In order to comply with the requirements of the new EU plant health regime (regulation EU 2016/2031 of the European Parliament of the Council of 26 October 2016 on protective measures against pests of plants), some European countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, have developed methodologies for prioritizing plant health risks from pests at the national level (Moignot and Reynaud 2013; Baker et al. 2014) . These efforts have focused on conventional threats of exotic, invasive plant pests that historically have been either accidentally introduced through trade or passively spread, for example by wind currents. Until recently, little attention has been paid to the possible, deliberate misuse of plant pathogens as 'weapons' against agroecosystems. As Josling et al. (2003) observe "since the terrorist attacks (…) on September 11th 2001 (…), biosecurity has taken on new dimensions and products that move across borders are treated more suspiciously, [creating] uncertainty and transaction costs that impinge particularly on trade that could put domestic animal, plant or human populations at risk". The term 'agroterrorism' corresponds to the deliberate misuse of biological agents against agriculture, including crops and cattle, by nonstate actors, that is, a subset of 'bioterrorism'. 'Biocrime' and 'biowarfare', however, can be included in a general definition referring to the "intentional use, as well as the threat or simulation of use of plant pathogens by any individual or group in order to cause direct damage to crops or forests, or to indirectly affect the agricultural sector" (Latxague et al. 2007 ). The distinction between bioterrorism, biocrime and biowarfare was made for several transdisciplinary components, especially concerning the legal framework and risk assessment (Chap. 6). This distinction also acknowledges that each of these 'agro-risks' possesses a number of distinct characteristics, across a wide range of prospective scenarios. The economy of Europe is heavily dependent on its agricultural resources. Crops and forests cannot be entirely monitored and protected because they are grown on large and often patchy areas. Scientists and government stakeholders in several countries are reconsidering the vulnerability of agroecosystems to plant pests potentially used as bioweapons because of the socio-economical significance of crops and forests (Rogers et al. 1999; Foxwell 2001; Cochrane and Haslett 2002; Suffert 2003; Madden and Wheelis 2003; Khetarpal and Gupta 2007; Caldas and Perz 2013; Khalil and Shinwari 2014) . The vulnerability of Europe is extremely difficult to assess, probably because the definition of the concept of the 'agroterrorist threat' is weak due to its dual nature: it has both a biological and a human dimension (Barbier 2008) . This creates a paradoxical combination of science-based discourse about 'plant pathogens' or 'pests' (the weapons) and subjective views about 'perpetrators' (the human entity): Who are they, why are they acting, what are their capacities and knowledge? Understanding the ideologies and motivations that would direct a person, an organization or a state to attack the agricultural sector through biological means is important for understanding how better to assess the risk for Europe (Chap. 6). There are many ideological, economical and geopolitical interests that could lead to agroterrorism. Perpetrators can be motivated by a variety of objectives, including some specific to Europe. The tactics used to accomplish these objectives may be as varied as the motivations. The choice of attacking crops as a target could be aimed at a number of outcomes: inducing yield losses, undermining confidence in the agricultural sector, creating a profit-making opportunity, extorting money by threatening to introduce a pest, coertion or intimidation of a government, provocation of a response to support insurgent forces, etc. The risk assessment of such a scenario would be erroneous if it focuses only on a single type of act or perpetrator. This could result from the attention arising from the events or the topics reported by news media. On the other hand, the risk assessment also would fall short if it does not take into account the current context related to the human dimension.
For the past two decades, agroterrorism has received increased attention ( Fig. 2.1 ) and it has been subject to greater discussion within academic, media, and government circles, especially in the United States after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax infections. Studies around that period began arguing that agroterrorism represents a new and dire threat to national security (Casagrande 2000; Madden and Wheelis 2003; Cupp et al. 2004; Polyak 2004) . Agroterrorism was framed as a specific issue of security research for crop protection, which contributed to the emergence of agricultural bioforensics (application of scientific methods to the investigation of possible violations of the law, where scientific knowledge and technology provide evidence in both criminal and civil matters) in the US during the 2000s (Budowle 2003; Murch 2003; Fletcher et al. 2006; Kamenidou et al. 2013) . The vulnerability of the US agro-industrial sector was considered -rightly or wrongly -as high (Wheelis et al. 2002) . Such a perception seems to be mainly based on the assessment of the human dimension of the threat, considering that the 'intentionality' correlated to the traumatic impact of terrorist attacks in the US. In reality, this intentionality is still very difficult to assess (Rohn and Erez 2013) . The perception could be summarized by the motto "Because it's not a question of IF, but a question of WHEN" (Suffert et al. 2008) , warning that agroterrorism is an imminent threat that should be taken seriously. In retrospect, the alarmist conclusions of some US reports were conjecture, based on worst 
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The asymmetry of knowledge between the biological and the human dimensions of the threat remains a key component of this issue. The lack of a common definition of agroterrorism, probably due to the recent more widespread interest in this topic, explains in part why the agroterrorist threat for European crops and forests had not yet been exhaustively assessed by appropriate methods. Unverified allegations (Table 2 .1), alarmist reports (Rogers et al. 1999; Wheelis et al. 2002) and programs disclaimed for their cost (Schwägerl 2005) did not favor the recognition of agroterrorism in Europe as the real threat that the author believes it is. In this context the EU launched two successive research projects named CropBioterror (Gullino et al. 2006) and PlantFoodSec (Gullino et al. 2011) . The goal was to build up expertise and develop awareness and preparedness concerning the risk of intentional threats against crops or the food chain, and to assess possible economic outcomes of such an attack in Europe. Those projects were complemented by a third, AniBioThreat, concerning the threat of agroterrorism against animals ). The projects resulted in a scientifically-based framework, scientific knowledge and tools that can be used to delimit the scope of the issue and its associated narratives.
The goal of this chapter is to draw up an inventory and a specific analysis of agroterrorism risks for Europe based on both historical approaches and contextualization of the 'dual threat' (biological and human dimension). The chapter also attempts to describe and qualify the potential threat, before considering assessment of the overall risk (Chap. 6). The first problem with the term 'agroterrorism', as defined for example by Latxague et al. (2007) , is that it refers to different types of acts related to the multiplicity of potential perpetrators, motivations, targets (crops) and agents (pests). In addition to the three main categories characterized by distinct objectives (biological warfare, bioterrorism, and biocrime; Latxague et al. 2007 ), a typology of consequences was proposed: impact on production (destruction of crops or reduced yields), impact on trade in agricultural products (due to prohibition or additional measures linked to the conditions caused by agroterrorism), impact on human or animal health, impact of an environmental and heritage nature, psychological impact on consumers, and social destabilization. This classification based on motivations and potential consequences was used to draw up and then analyze several prospective scenarios (Chap. 6).
Historical Review of Agroterrorism and Anti-crop Bioweapons: Starting Point of the Characterization and Contextualized of the Threat in Europe
The starting point of agroterrorism risk qualification is a global review of historical programs, allegations and acts. Analysis of such data is necessary to contextualize the assessment and to adapt it to the present and future European situation. Indeed, the socio-economic and geopolitical situation in Europe is changing and is not always similar to other areas in the world.
First Type of Threat: From Military State Programs to Allegations of Attacks
The qualification of risk of agroterrorism was, and still is, strongly affected by the military dimension of the threat, particularly in reference to state biowarfare programs or 'state allegations'. Table 2 .1, Fig. 2 .2) and the GDR government made the claim that the beetles were dropped by American planes. Similar allegations were made by Cuba, which accused the US of a biological attack with Puccinia melanocephala (sugarcane rust) and Peronospora hyosciami f. sp. tabacina (tobacco blue mold) in the 1960s (Table 2 .1; Zilinskas 1999). During the same period, a wide range of plant pathogens, including Magnaporthe grisea, were the subject of research by Japan; the potential impact of these programs on Europe was low as they mainly concerned the rice crop.
Second Type of Threat: From 'Rogue State' Secret Programs to Emerging Terrorist Groups
While the states that signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1972 have officially renounced the development of biological warfare programs, a new cycle of concern over the possible use of anti-crop bioweapons began in the late 1980s. This was based on the knowledge that several 'rogue states' (conducting their policy in a dangerously unpredictable way, disregarding international law or diplomacy) were trying to acquire this type of weapon. The 1980-2000 period, viewed as the transition from the Cold War to the globalization era, also raised concerns among several EU member states that some countries suspected of harboring potential anti-crop agents may be involved in developing them as weapons. More recently, evidence was purportedly found in caves in Afghanistan that suggested interest by Islamic militants in the weaponization of wheat rust . Following the First Gulf War, the United Nations Special Commission's inspections revealed that Iraq had expressed an interest in acquiring the military capacity to destroy Iranian crops and that progress had been made in research and development for the weaponization of wheat smut fungi (Tilletia caries and T. tritici) and aflatoxin-producing strains of the fungus Aspergillus ( ). An allegation of the deliberate introduction of the Western corn rootworm (Diabrotica virgifera) into European maize fields in the 1990s appeared on social media by internet; the fact that a population genetics study demonstrated the occurrence of multiple transatlantic introductions of the pest made it harder for the general public to reject the claims (Table 2 .1). Scholarly publications are often ignored in this setting (Miller et al. 2005; Ciosi et al. 2008) . One conspiracy scenario involved the deliberate release of the Western corn rootworm by a private company in order to sell biotech solutions in Europe, where the introduction of genetically modified organisms has been intensively debated. Now, after each new accidental introduction of a pest, allegations of deliberate introduction can be found on internet. This was the case after the detection of Xylella fastidiosa in Italy in 2013. Accusations have ranged from a deliberate plot by a private company to introduce strains of olive trees that resist the bacteria to a mafia plot to force farmers to sell their land to land developers at low prices after the eradication olive trees. Much more seriously, in December 2015 nine scientists were investigated for a possible role in negligently enabling the disease outbreak by Italian prosecutors. They worried that Xylella strains may have been imported from California for a scientific training workshop in 2010, and may then have been released into the environment. Plant pathologists were officially suspected of "negligent spreading of the plant disease, presenting false information and materials to officials, environmental pollution and disfiguring natural beauty". Currently the truth of the matter is not established but this case illustrate that the consequences of allegations of deliberate introduction on the agricultural sector, from growers to scientists, are almost as high as from the introduction itself. Furthermore, the potential of intensified judicial involvement in a phytosanitary crisis will modify the posture of scientists and experts working in the field of plant protection.
Some plant pathogenic fungi that produce mycotoxins are already a recurrent cause of plant disease, such as Fusarium graminearum and F. culmorum on wheat or Penicilium expansum on apples (Russell and Paterson 2006) . European assessments did not consider mycotoxin-producing fungi as serious anti-crop agents because of the low levels of mycotoxins and the availability of detection methods. However, based on biotechnical considerations and the fact that these may potentially affect human or cattle health, these pathogens might be reassessed. For example, the previous assessment disregarded the potential psychological effects of a malevolent contamination of food on the population. A deliberate introduction of a plant pathogen may cause significant public panic and a loss of confidence in a segment or the whole of the food chain, seriously affecting niche sectors of European agriculture (such as organic farming). Additionally, a perpetrator with limited technical and scientific skills would increase the potential impact by using simple intimidation or blackmail rather than actually attempting to contaminate the target: fear would have sufficient repercussions on trade and economy (Turvey et al. 2003 (Turvey et al. , 2010 Waage and Mumford 2008) .
Fourth Type of Threat: From the Application of Phytosanitary or Sanitary Measures in Response to Deliberate Introduction of a Regulated Pest to Justify Trade Protectionism
According to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the World Trade Organization (WTO 1995), every member country has the right to impose import restrictions to protect the health of crops and forests, or consumers in regard to food safety, as long as no unfair discrimination or hidden trade barriers are created. Import restrictions should be technically justified (so, for plant pests "justified on the basis of conclusions reached by using an appropriate pest risk analysis or, where applicable, another comparable examination and evaluation of available scientific information"; IPPC 2004; Heather and Hallman 2008) . It is conceivable that a state or other actor could intentionally introduce a plant pest into an import consignment as a pretext to justify trade protectionism. The intention could be to preserve a domestic market, or disparage a competing supplying country. The objective of this kind of operation would not be to provoke direct damage to a crop, but to induce a false detection of a regulated pest or of a food hazard to cause the imposition of protectionist measures. However, trade disruption may not automatically follow a detection of a quarantine organism, unless there is an indication to the authorities of an ongoing unacceptable risk.
List of Targets Crops and Pests as Biological Data Base: Starting Point of a Prospective Approach to Quantify the Risk in Europe
Officially no act of agroterrorism has occurred in Europe in the past, excluding some criminal cases of human food poisoning. Programs existed, but none was applied. Yet the threat exists and European agriculture is a critical part of the regional economy. The combined agricultural and food sector forms an important part of the EU economy, accounting for 15 million jobs (8.3 % of total employment) and 4.4 % of the gross domestic product (GDP). The EU is the world's largest producer of food and beverages, with combined production estimated at 675 billion Euros (European Commission, Eurostat, November 2014). The self-sufficiency of the EU in basic agricultural products is vital, not only for the wellbeing of its citizens, but also for the geopolitical independence of its member states. The economic, social and political importance of agriculture is therefore much greater than its share in the GDP of the EU. Crops and forests are vulnerable because they are grown over large ares, often with low levels of management. Although the opportunity for monitoring production areas in Europe is greater than in the rest of the world, these areas cannot be 'protected' from attack. A perpetrator may consider there is a low chance of being observed releasing plant pathogens in a field and there is little that can done initially to limit disease or pest spread (Madden and Wheelis 2003; Madden and van den Bosch 2002) . In reality, results of risk assessments showed that, contrary to the assertion that agroterrorism is 'low tech, high impact' (Wheelis et al. 2002) , deliberate contamination of plants in large forest areas, for example, are not technically easy to achieve (Suffert et al. 2009 ) and success of such an attack is not guaranteed. The misperception may result from an erroneous militarization of the threat. Lastly, while the probability that a given crop in a given European country will be a target for a given motivation by a given perpetrator is low, the overall probability that Europe will be concerned someday by an act of agroterrorism sensu lato is relatively high.
Types of Scenarios, Human Dimension of the Threat
The foresight approach developed in Chap. 6 is aimed at exploring the diversity of the potential scenarios (Table 2. 2). They consist of a list of conditions and assumptions, pertaining to potential attacks, and a list of rules. ). Species present in OMR 1 were excluded, while some crops that are not present in Europe but have a strategic importance for the European industry were taken into account (e.g. rubber plantations). The crops were organized in 11 groups: field crops, vineyards, orchards, vegetable crops, nursery and ornamental horticulture, medicinal and aromatic plants, forest production, beverage crops, straw, tree Terrorist attack aimed to damage a crop or a tree species that belongs to the patrimony of a country or a group of countries. Biocrime BC1
Target Crops
Attack by activists or farmers groups against the production of a concurrent country.
BC2
Isolated attack by an individual working in the crop protection field, looking for revenge upon a colleague or an institution.
BC3
Deliberate use of a plant pathogen by a private company. The aim would be to render farmers dependant on specific cultivars or plant protection products.
From Latxague et al. (2007) sap, seeds. In total 451 crops were inventoried and considered in the subsequent risk analysis. A first classification of the most important crops was established on the basis of the economic value of production (cultivated area × mean yield × mean price; data Eurostat). Crops were preliminarily selected when value of production exceeded 200 million Euros; 79 cultivated plants or tree species were concerned. For these 79 crops and tree, 17 criteria were filled. They were organized in 4 metacriterias (MT1, 'economical importance'; MT2 'sociological importance'; MT3 'consumption importance'; MT4 'environmental importance') which were completed and assessed by as describe in Table 2 .3. Finally, a short prioritized list of 21 target crops strategic for Europe, chosen as important for socio-economic reasons, was established (Table 2.4). Figure 2 .3 illustrates that the use of a correction index modified the rank of only three crops (oilseed rape, oil olive and dessert apple) that did not appeared to be more important than others (e.g. sugar beet) if the "value of production" only was used for the ranking. The importance of tree species, such as scots pine, Norway spruce and oak, is probably underestimated because this considered only the annual wood production (in average, approximated by the annual increase in wood biomass). In this context, the importance of perennial crops (wine grape, oil olive, dessert apple, orange, peach) is probably also underestimated considering their replacement cost values (the actual cost to replace the crop to its pre-loss condition). This issue can be illustrated by the real socio-economical impact of extreme climatic events or epidemics that have destroyed plantations in the past, for example the Phylloxera which destroyed most of the European vineyards in the late nineteenth century, the consequence of the 1999 storm for forests along the Atlantic coasts, or more recently the French outbreak of Ceratocystis platani which led to the decision to cut down some plane trees along the Canal du Midi.
Pests Used as Bioweapons, Second Component of the Biological Dimension of the Threat
A non-prioritized comprehensive list of pests comprised of 570 pests of plant hosts cultivated or naturally present in Europe or having an high economic importance for some European countries was established based on historical lists of a similar nature (Table 2 .5), and was completed by several experts. Each pest that could have an impact on at least one of the 21 crops listed in Fig. 2.3 and which was listed in at least four historical reviews (Table 2.5) was added in the non-prioritized short list of pests (Table 2 .6), then taken into account to assess the risk of agroterrorism for Europe. This short list was completed by adding a pest which was specifically used to elaborate the WP3 agroterrorist scenario (Table 2. 3; Chap. 7). 1.8 10 10 € 4.6 10 9 € 1.9 10 9 € value of production corrective index Fig. 2.3 Short list of the most important crops and forest tree species for Europe for socioeconomical reasons. The classification was based on the value production, completed by a supplementary value obtained using a correction coefficient to take into account non-economic criteria (Table 2. 3). Species whose rank was slightly modified after the use of this correction coefficient are indicated with grey bars 
Established by the American Phytopathological Society (APS) and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).
The list, published in the Federal Register of August 12, 2002,is displayed on the APS website, together with a paper that presents APS recommendations on countering agricultural bioterrorism with crop biosecurity practices. This list was prepared as part of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act, which was designed to "improve the ability of the United States to prevent, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies that could threaten public health and safety or American agriculture". The following criteria were used to develop the list -effect of an agent or toxin on animal or plant health or on products -virulence of an agent or degree of toxicity of the toxin and the methods by which the agents or toxins are transferred to animals or plants -availability and effectiveness of medicines and vaccines to treat and prevent any illness caused by an agent or toxin -other criteria that the Secretary considers appropriate to protect animal or plant health, or animal or plant products Kamenidou et al. (2013) and published as special report in the APS Journal "Plant Disease". The list includes plant pathogens having significant potential for damage to US agricultural and natural ecosystems. Easily accessible informational resource tool was also developed to assist law enforcement personnel in the event of a disease investigation by providing key information on pathogens of concern (continued) (IUCN) . The ISSG is an international group of scientific and policy experts on invasive species. It aims to reduce threats to natural ecosystems and the native species they contain by increasing awareness about invasive alien species, and defining ways to prevent, control or eradicate them. Species included in the list of "100 of the (continued) 
Evolution and Contextualization of the Threat in Europe
Anti-crop biowarfare was a relevant geopolitical and military issue until the 1980s. Awareness for biosecurity has increased from 1990 to 2000 owing to growing 'Trade', 'Travel', 'Transportation', and 'Tourism', summarized pertinently as the "four T's" components of globalization by Waage and Mumford (2008) . While agroterrorism was a minor issue until the past two decades, it strongly emerged after 1997 (Suffert et al. 2008 ; Fig. 2.1 ). Subsequent general issues of agricultural biosecurity would be influenced during the next decade by a large set of different components. The nature of the changes was complex and it is necessary to identify in light of the current situation which modifications in the geopolitical and socioeconomical context could transform the perception of the agroterrorist threat in Europe. After several years of in depth and, to the degree possible, neutral analysis, the threat of agroterrorism seems to fall into four categories by important determinants of the change. These can be identified presently as the "four C's" components 'Convergence Tactics', 'Constraints', 'Climate', 'Conspiracy'. (Liddick 2006; Lodadenthal 2013) should be taken into consideration.
Convergence Tactics
Conspiracy Several allegations about deliberate introduction of plant pests, viewed as the expression of a conspiracy theory, developed on the internet and social networks since the 2000s. In the past, allegations usually were state propaganda. Most of allegations are now 'civilian', in the sense that they are raised by private citizens or pressure groups, sometimes organized at an international level. Perpetrators or malicious whistleblowers can use social media as their modus operandi, while defenders, including organizations in charge of crop protection, can use it for peaceful purposes (i.e. for collecting valuable information and monitor social media before, during, and after an act of agroterrorism). The impact of this dual-use dilemma of social media in biopreparedness was analyzed by Sjöberg et al. (2013) in the case of an animal bioterrorism incident. Furthermore, Rohn and Erez (2013) asserted that early detection of 'data' enables preventive measures using overt data sources on internet is the best risk-management approach; however, to be efficient, this approach must allow to distinguish between between plausible and implausible allegation. In this context, the risk of 'false positive', such as the risk of considering that a pest introduction was deliberate while a natural or accidental cause was established, is as high as the risk of 'false negative', such as the risk of not being able to establish the deliberate nature of the pest introduction.
Current and Future Answers to Agroterrorism: Real or False Solutions?
The dual use potential of biotechnology research should be considered to pose a risk to crop biosecurity. For example, the United Nations Bioweapons Office has stated concern over the possibilities for weaponization of the 'gene drive' technology (Begley 2015) . There are some methods (e.g., CRISPR-Cas9 genome editing) that consists of designing a gene delivery system that will cause it to be inherited at greater than the usual inheritance rate, thereby possibly spreading into an entire insect or pathogen population in a relatively short time period. Although beneficial uses, such as control of disease vector, are under study, the possibilities for weaponizing gene drives range from suppressing populations of pollinators to giving innocuous insects the ability to carry plant diseases. This example raises the question of the need for surveillance of possible dual-use research, for example by the 'Australia Group'. As Suffert et al. (2009) stated, the capacity of European countries to prevent an act of agroterrorism requires the involvement of all parties interested in crop biosecurity. They are expected to consider the multiplicity of threats and to collaborate to implement specific countermeasures. Regulation in terms of national biosecurity may not be a sufficient preventive approach to control intentional use of plant pathogens that have been found to fulfil the proposed criteria for a biological weapon. Furthermore, Pasquali (2006) , Young et al. (2008) and Suffert et al. (2009) hold a view that European academic and scientific activities should not be inhibited by specific regulations (censure of scientific knowledge, restriction of exchanges of scientific material and movement of scientists, etc.). After the detection of a suspicious disease outbreak, in which a plant pathogen may have been used as an anticrop weapon, an efficient response would require a collection of evidence that allows identification of the source as early as possible, as well as the method and timing of introduction, and of course the perpetrators (Schaad et al. 2003) . In other words, such a situation would have a similar approach to a criminal investigation. To this end, the use of legal molecular-based detection technologies, summarized in the term 'bioforensic' , would be necessary to flag the occurrence of suspicious epidemics.
Biotechnology is only a tool, however, not the finality. The purpose of any investigation performed in a putative 'scene of agroterrorism' is to acquire epidemiological evidences, by both deductive and inductive reasoning and to gain knowledge of the events surrounding the alleged criminal act (Chap. 9). The main difference with a classical scene of crime is that the demonstration of the criminal nature of the contamination event (contrary to natural or accidental event) should be the first objective (Elbers and Knutsson 2013) . It is also a real challenge. Bioforensic tools ) and databases (Kamenidou et al. 2013) need to be coupled with classical epidemiological approach for assessing the likelihood that a plant disease outbreak may have been intentionally incited. One of the goals of the PlantFoodSec project was to produce scientific knowledge on the build-up, persistence and release of primary inoculum and the early stages of epidemics of selected plant pathogens to differentiate between the consequences of natural and deliberate field contamination. Would investigators be able to differentiate the deliberate introduction of a plant pathogen from an 'accidental' or 'natural' outbreak? In several cases the answer is probably no, because the main issue, "How does a natural epidemic start", is still a poorly resolved question in plant disease epidemiology. The concept of 'initial inoculum' persists as a black box. Two cases study of important pathogens of wheat, Puccinia triticina (the cause of leaf rust) and Zymoseptoria tritici (the cause of septoria leaf blotch) were developed by combining experimental and modeling approaches (Morais et al. 2015 (Morais et al. , 2016a Soubeyrand et al., 2017) in order to track the early onset of epidemics. Despite the approach suggested above, countermeasures based exclusively on early detection would be ineffective in regard to the specific features of some prospective scenarios (Latxague et al. 2007; Suffert et al. 2009 ).
Despite the aforementioned challenges, the need for greater preparedness in Europe remains. The contributions of the PlantFoodSec project should improve the chances of 'getting it right' under the pressure of encountering possible agroterrorism in an increasingly uncertain world.
